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Abstract
Choice Overload is a phenomenon well studied in psychology. It goes against the classical more is better dogma and describes
the behavior of an agent when presented with too many options, in which instance an agent may either experience a decrease in
satisfaction or end up deferring the choice all together. The standard Utility Maximization model of economics, however, largely
follows the classical dogma and is unable to accommodate the behaviors of Choice Overload. This paper seeks to offer two
possible economic models for Choice Overload based on the two mechanisms put forward by the psychological literature: search
cost and cost of anticipated regret.

1. INTRODUCTION

children of autonomy-oriented grade school teachers reported
more self-motivation and higher self-esteem than the children

It is a common, sometimes daily, occurrence to walk

of more control-oriented teachers (Deci, 1981). Another study

into a supermarket and see aisles upon aisles of different product

finds that having the ability to choose for oneself can increase

options. Twenty four types of olive oil. Fifteen types of milk.

task performance, as nursing home patients that are allowed

Fifty types of ice cream. This all comes from the belief that

more choice in their life show greater

alertness, active

more is better, particularly when it comes to having options.

participation, and a general sense of well-being (Langer &

This belief then pushes suppliers to offer more variety in hopes

Rodin, 1976). Even if a person does not actually have more

that it will attract more customers and increase sales. Even

agency to choose, just the illusion of choice is enough to incite

beyond product variety, having more options is generally looked

positive effects. The unwarranted illusion of choice has been

upon favorably as many people tend to go for choices that leave

associated with greater confidence (Langer, 1975) and even the

their options open .

ability to care about others, the ability to be happy or contented,

This is a belief that seems to be supported by more than

and the ability to engage in productive and creative work

the shelving habits of the local grocery store. One often finds

(Taylor & Brown, 1988). Some research has even shown that

that in studies of psychological wellness and marketing strategy,

when people and animals feel like their ability to choose is taken

it is shown that the practice of personal choice has various

away with regard to impending reinforcements, severely

positive effects. One study finds that the provision of choice can

negative consequences can result including distractibility,

increase intrinsic motivation and perceived confidence, as

ulcers, or death (Lefcourt, 1973). Clearly this last example
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features instances of choice that are much more extreme than

of Choice: Why More Is Less that laments the gratuity of

deciding what kind of ice cream to buy, but it still indicates the

options not only in stores but also in life as people struggle to

importance of choice.

balance career, family, and individual needs,

and suggests

From studies such as these, a common notion has been

that self-limiting one s choices can lead to greater satisfaction

developed saying that it is always better to have more options

with those choices (Schwartz, 2004). Even the act of choosing

and that variety is always a virtue. Why then do a plethora of

has been shown to have its limits in its positive effects. One

marketing studies find that there are benefits from a reduction

study found that participants who were tasked with making

of variety in stores? In response to retailers reluctance to reduce

more decisions experienced less physical stamina, reduced

stock even in response to declining demand for fear of attracting

persistence in the face of failure, more procrastination, and less

fewer customers, one study researched how consumers perceive

quality and quantity of arithmetic calculations (Vohs et al,

retail assortment and found that a reduction of specifically low-

2008). This phenomenon has been titled Choice Overload, and

demand items does not significantly affect assortment

it refers to a collection of behaviors that can arise from engaging

perception (Broniarczyk et al, 1998). Other studies go further in

with too much variety and choice including unhappiness,

showing how having more variety on store shelves may increase

decision fatigue, choosing a default option, and deferring the

attractiveness to customers with diminishing returns (Roberts &

choice all together (that is, choosing not to choose). Recently,

Lattin, 1991) and how a larger product line may in some cases

psychologists have moved on from simply proving the existence

decrease the likelihood that that brand is chosen (Draganska &

of Choice Overload to trying to find its specifications and limits.

Jain, 2005). Still other marketing research papers talk about a

A meta-analysis conducted in 2014 collected all such research

necessary balance between perceived assortment variety and

and concluded that whether or not Choice Overload is prompted

perceived inter-item complexity , implying that there is an

depends on choice set complexity, decision task difficulty,

upper bound to the benefits of variety (Kahn, Weingarten, &

preference

uncertainty,

and

Townsend, 2013).

Böckenholt, & Goodman, 2014).

decision

goal

(Chernev,

The conflicting results of previous psychological

To talk more specifically about Choice Overload in a

studies that have praised the prospect of choice and marketing

consumer context, this paper draws inspiration from what is

studies that warn of the dangers of too much variety have caused

probably the most famous instance of research on Choice

psychologists to go back and research in more detail the effects

Overload: the jam study by Sheena S. Iyengar and Mark R.

of varying levels of choice. From this research, several

Lepper in 2000. Iyengar and Lepper set up a tasting booth to sell

psychological studies have subsequently concluded that more

jam in a grocery store known for its variety of offerings and its

options may not always lead to better results. One study found

established tasting booth culture. Over the course of two 5-hour

that when college students had to select soft drink flavors from

periods on two Saturdays, they observed 754 shoppers and their

a given set of options, satisfaction with their choice did not

consumption behavior. In one period, they displayed 6 jams (the

differ depending on the size of the choice set (Reibstein,

limited set) while in the other period they displayed 24 jams (the

Youngblood, & Fromkin, 1975). Others have indicated that

extensive set). Iyengar and Lepper had experimenters

having a choice set that is too large can actually lead to a

clandestinely monitor the tasting booth to see what percent of

decrease in satisfaction. Barry Schwartz, a psychology professor

passing customers stopped to taste the jams and then what

at Swarthmore College, wrote a famous book titled The Paradox

percentage of those tasters ended up actually purchasing some
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jam. Following the common belief that more is better , 60% of

These experiments imply two important findings. First,

passing customers (145 of 240) stopped at the extensive jam

though there is some utility in variety, at some point the process

display while only 40% of passing customers (104 of 260)

of choosing from too many options begins to decrease

stopped at the limited jam display. The purchasing behavior,

satisfaction from that choice. Second, having too many options

however, seem to support instead the concept of Choice

may at some point become preventative, making the consumer

Overload. The limited display showed 30% (31 of 104) of the

defer the choice for a later time.

tasters ended up buying some jam while only 3% (4 of 145)
ended up buy jam after stopping at the extensive display. Having
the extensive set to choose from seemed to cause consumers to
more often defer their choice. Surprisingly, this result

2.

DIFFERENCE

FROM

STANDARD

ECONOMIC THEORY

demonstrates that though people seem initially attracted to

Despite multiple studies showing that choice overload

greater variety, having more options may not always lead to a

is a set pattern of human behavior, particularly in regards to

better outcome, in this case more revenue for the booth.

consumption, standard economic theory fails to be able to

The same paper by Iyengar and Lepper includes

explain it. In the standard model, there exists a set of all possible

another study that tests how a varying amount of options can

alternatives, called a domain, but agents choose from a non-

affect the consumer s satisfaction with their choice. They took

empty subset of available alternatives, called a menu, which will

134 chocolate-loving Columbia University students and asked

be represented as B. For the sake of both simplicity and

them to choose some chocolate from a set of options. One group

practicality, menus under consideration in this paper can be

of subjects was able to choose a piece of chocolate from 6

taken to be finite menus, menus with a finite amount of items.

options and the other group could choose a piece of chocolate

The standard model assumes that agents have a utility function.

from 30 options. A control group was simply given a piece of

A utility function is a function that assigns a utility value to

chocolate to eat. Afterwards, the experimenters asked the

every item in a menu. The choice that a subject makes is the

subjects to rate how tasty, enjoyable, and satisfying the

item(s) that the subject selects from the menu B, denoted C(B).

chocolate was on a scale of 1 to 7, which was then combined

Formally, it is presumed that an agent faces a certain menu

into a composite score of the subject s overall satisfaction with

multiple times and each time the agent picks one item from the

their chosen piece of chocolate. The results show a similar

menu, but that chosen item may not always be the same. For

pattern to the one in the jam experiment. There was a

instance, considering a menu B = {a, b}, they could choose

statistically significant difference in the rated satisfaction levels,
with subjects who chose from the limited set showing an

options a sometimes and option b at other times, making the
choice from the menu including those two alternatives equal to

average rating of 6.28 and subjects who chose from the

C(B) = {a, b}. In other cases, the agent may always choose b

extensive set showing an average rating of 5.46. Both choice

over a, in which case C(B) = {b}. C(B) is the subset of B

groups, however, showed more satisfaction with the chocolate

consisting of the alternatives that the agent is observed to

than did the control group. This indicates that there is some

choose. The way that subjects choose which items to select is

utility to be gained from getting a choice, but at a certain point,

by following their utility function. Thus the choice of the

the process of choosing begins to hinder the satisfaction of the

standard model is

experience.
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the element with the maximum utility in B. If lower or

𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑈 𝑎
𝑎∈𝐵

equivalent, the maximum utility in the new set stays the same.

In the standard model, C(B) is the set of elements in the
menu that maximize the utility function, hence why this model
is also called the Utility Maximization model. Since C(B) is
always predetermined for a given menu via an agent s utility
function, it can be said that the utility of the menu as a whole is
also predetermined by the utility of the alternatives in C(B). The
value of a menu to an agent is defined by the maximum utility
they can achieve from the menu through their choices. This

If higher, however, this new element becomes the new
maximum utility of the menu. Thus, the value of the maximum
utility element of the new menu can only stay the same or
increase by adding more elements. Putting this into different yet
equivalent words, the utility of a menu can only stay the same
or increase by adding more elements, since the utility of a menu
in the standard model is the same thing as the value of the
maximum utility element of that menu.
This implication of the standard model is not directly

value of a menu defines its value function:

testable, because utility is not directly observable. If we follow

𝑉 𝐵

the psychologists and take their measures of satisfaction as a

max 𝑈 𝑎 ,
𝑎∈𝐵

measure of utility, however, then utility can then be treated as

where V(B) is defined by the maximum value of U(a) where a

an observable object. It should be noted that this is a practice of

is any item, or element, in menu B. As discussed in Section 2,

psychology since economists do not measure utility and instead

consumers experience a certain level of satisfaction with their

almost exclusively generate conclusions based on observed

choice and with their experience when making a purchase. This

choices, making the prior assumption non-standard.

is the natural interpretation of asking about one s value function.

While the first proposition focuses on the satisfaction

Given this standard model, two propositions are

gained from a choice, the second proposition questions whether
a choice should be made at all; in other words, deferral. In order

presented as key properties.
The first proposition states that larger menus yield

to talk about deferral of choice, that behavior must first be
defined formally. Informally, deferral is defined as the decision

higher satisfaction.

to not make a choice at the present time. Formally, fix an
Proposition 1 [Monotonicity]: F
𝐵 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑈 𝐵

a

e

B,B , if 𝐵 ⊂

alternative, represented as o , and interpret it as the agent s
outside option. For example, customers at a restaurant can either

𝑈 𝐵 .

choose an item from the menu or they can choose not to choose
Proof: If 𝐵 ⊂ 𝐵′, then the maximizer of U in B lies in
B as well. Therefore, the maximizer in B has to be at
least as good as the maximizer in B. That is,
max 𝑈 𝑎
𝑎∈𝐵

max 𝑈 𝑎 . Thus 𝑈 𝐵
𝑎∈𝐵

and leave the restaurant. In this case, leaving the restaurant is
the outside option, which is equivalent to the customer choosing
deferral and refusing to make a choice.
The second proposition states that if a non-deferral

𝑈 𝐵 .•

The intuition for the proof is as follows: If a menu B is
comprised of menu B plus some additional elements, then those

choice was chosen in one menu, adding more options to that
menu will not result in the agent now choosing to defer the
choice.

new elements can have utilities higher, lower, or equivalent to
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Proposition 2 [Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives]: For

o is not chosen in the small menu, it cannot be chosen

a

in the big menu. •

e

B, B

ch ha 𝑜 ∈ 𝐵 ⊂ 𝐵 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑜 ∉ 𝐶 𝐵 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 o ∉

𝐶 𝐵 .
These propositions are implied by the Utility
Proof: Since menus are finite, there always exists a

Maximization model, thus if people behaved according to the

maximizer. Therefore, if

o ∉ 𝐶 𝐵 , there must exist

standard model of economics, observed human behavior would

some other alternative 𝑎 ∈ 𝐵 such that 𝑎 ∈ 𝐶 𝐵 . In

show the patterns described in Propositions 1 and 2. In fact,

particular 𝑈 𝑜

𝑈 𝑎). Thus, in the larger menu B ,

these two propositions support the aforementioned common

there still exists the alternative a, so o can never

belief that having more options is always a good thing, which is

maximize utility and 𝑜 ∉ 𝐶 𝐵 . •

why grocery stores will dedicate entire aisles to different types
of potato chips and peanut butter companies will offer more than

The intuition for this proof is as follows: If an element

12 types of peanut butter. At first glance, it indeed seems like

c is chosen from menu B, and deferral is not chosen from B, that

real world actions follow from the conclusions of these two

must mean that c has the maximum utility of all elements in B

propositions, but as has already been shown, that simply is not

and it has a greater utility than deferral, by nature of Utility

the case.

Maximization. Then, if B is a larger menu made from adding a

Many studies of choice psychology demonstrate that

few more elements onto B, then the maximum utility of B can

these testable implications arising from the standard model and

only be larger than or equal to the maximum utility of B (see

described in the propositions above are violated in real life.

proof for Proposition 1). This necessitates that the utility of

Increasing the size of a menu can lead to less satisfaction with

deferral is still less than the maximum utility of B , which means

both the process of choosing and with the eventually chosen

that it cannot be chosen within the Utility Maximization model.

item, and once increased to a certain degree, the size of a menu

Another way of proving Proposition 2 uses a well-

can become so daunting that the agent prefers not to make a

Al ha. Sen s

choice and defers their choice even though they would make a

Alpha more generally states the independence of irrelevant

choice with a smaller menu. This difference between the

alternatives (IIA) which says that if a is chosen from a big set

standard model and observed behavior stems from the

B , then it must also be chosen from any small set 𝐵 ⊂ 𝐵′ that

assumption that in Utility Maximization, the agent is able to

contains a (Sen, 1971).

analyze and compare alternatives without any cost. Once a

known property of Utility Maximization: Se

menu is presented, the agent already knows their utility function
Definition [Se
e

A

a]: C a i fie Se

if f

a

B, B a d al e a i e 𝑎 such that 𝑎 ∈ 𝐵 ⊂ 𝐵′,

ai

f
if

𝑎 ∈ 𝐶 𝐵 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑎 ∈ 𝐶 𝐵 .

and can use that to effortlessly and instantly compare all the
options to figure out which alternative is the maximizer. This
kind of agent would walk into the potato chip aisle and leave it
one second later with the type of chips that they know will give

Alternative Proof of Proposition 2: Observe that if the

them the highest utility. Does this really sound like real life? No,

default option is chosen in the big menu, the default

in fact, far from it. Whether it s in the grocery store or in the

option must also be chosen in the small menu. Then if

middle of the night staring into a fridge for far too long, making
choices requires time and effort. Without this cost of decision
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making, a real life consumer might indeed only stand to benefit

the connection between the number of alternatives and

from having more options available to them. Given that decision

consumers purchasing behavior.

making does come with a cost, however, the costless Utility

The second mechanism assumes that the agent doesn t

Maximization model cannot account for the observed behavior

fully understand their current preferences, such as when a

of choice overload. As such, an expansion of the standard model

consumer decides to buy a product they have never tried before,

is required. Specifically, this new model must be able to

and they will only discover their preference with certainty after

accommodate Choice Overload behavior by violating the above

the choice is made. This allows for the possibility of regret if the

propositions,

agent finds out that they could have chosen an alternative that

thus

instead

having

the

properties

of

nonmonotonicity and choice deferral.

would ve given them higher utility than the alternative they did
choose. With larger menus, there is more chance that within the
set of alternatives not chosen, there will be an item that would

3.

ALTERNATIVE

MODELS

WITH

CHOICE OVERLOAD
The task of formulating a model to account for choice
overload first requires that the exact mechanism of choice

give higher utility than the item that was chosen, thus inducing
greater regret and less net utility. There have been a handful of
papers concerning regret in economic literature, starting with
the basic regret model (Loomes & Sudgen, 1982) and going on
to the MinMax Regret model (Hayashi, 2007), but these models

overload is understood. In fact, there are two main mechanisms

have largely not been applied to Choice Overload and do not

through which choice overload is speculated to take effect in the

allow

psychological literature (Mills, Meltzer, & Clark, 1977; Payne,

demonstrated in psychological research, such as the possibility

1982; Schwartz, 2004). The first assumes that in smaller menus,

that larger menus can lead to higher utility under certain

the cost of evaluating all the available alternatives is not

conditions (see Appendix for further discussion).

for

special

circumstances

of

Choice

Overload

prohibitively high, so agents simply analyze them all and follow

Some psychological studies have shown evidence of

utility maximization. In menus that are larger than a certain

both mechanisms occurring in different circumstances (Mills,

threshold, however, the cost of evaluating all the alternatives

Meltzer, & Clark, 1977; Payne, 1982; Schwartz, 2004). As such,

such that maximization can occur is higher than the potential

this paper will present two possible models of Choice Overload.

payoff from maximization. Thus, to decrease the cost of
evaluation, the agent instead follows a satisficing behavior and

Model 1: The Search Cost Model

uses some heuristic to make a quicker choice. Satisficing occurs
when an agent selects an option not because it is the maximum

This model type describes the mechanism whereby the

utility choice, but because it meets a minimum utility goal. Prior

agent must incur some cost of decision making to evaluate all

economic research on search costs has focused on the subject of

the alternatives and search for the utility maximizing one before

company incentives for obfuscation (Ellison & Wolitzky, 2012),

they can make a choice. This search cost prevents the agent from

but that subject addresses only consumers knowledge of

being able consider a near infinite amount of alternatives,

aspects of a certain number of products and does little to analyze

because eventually the cost of decision making becomes so
great that it surpasses the maximum utility gained from the
eventually chosen alternative. To begin to codify this
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mechanism of Choice Overload into an economic model, one
must introduce this search cost into the process of choosing. Say

argmax 𝑈𝑖 𝑎

if 𝐸 max 𝑈𝑖 𝑎

𝐾 𝑛

0

𝑜

if 𝐸 max 𝑈𝑖 𝑎

𝐾 𝑛

0

𝐾 𝑛

0

𝑎∈𝐵𝑛

𝐶 𝐵𝑛

that an agent believes with probability p that they will follow a
utility function U1, and with probability 1

p they will follow

𝑎∈𝐵𝑛

𝑎∈𝐵𝑛

Making the value function, V, defined as follows

a utility function U2. When facing the menu, however, the agent
doesn t know which of these is the true utility function. For
instance, a consumer may not know what features of a car they

𝐸 max 𝑈𝑖 𝑎
𝑉 𝐵𝑛

value most when buying a car for the first time. Only after

𝑎∈𝐵𝑛

0

𝐾 𝑛 if 𝐸 max 𝑈𝑖 𝑎
𝑎∈𝐵𝑛

if 𝐸 max 𝑈𝑖 𝑎
𝑎∈𝐵𝑛

𝐾 𝑛

0

incurring the cost of searching the entire menu, K(n), can they

It is easily seen that if the agent does make a choice, the

discover their utility function. Thus before incurring this cost,

resulting utility gain will be less than the utility gain they would

the agent must use these probabilities to form a belief about their

experience in the standard Utility Maximization model. Thus,

expected maximum utility gain from conducting the search. In

this Search Cost model is able to show how larger menus lead

either scenario, if the agent makes a choice they will choose the

to less satisfaction (nonmonotonicity) and can possibly lead to

maximizer of the menu, but that maximizer may differ

deferral. In this way, the Search Cost model is able to

depending on the utility function they follow. Thus, the cost of

accommodate the behavior of Choice Overload.

searching the menu is K(n) and expected utility gain from
searching B is

It should be noted that this model makes an important
assumption about the nature of the agent, and that is that once
the agent has begun searching through the entire menu, they

𝐸 max 𝑈𝑖 𝑎
𝑎∈𝐵

𝑝 ∗ max 𝑈1 𝑎
𝑎∈𝐵

1

𝑝 ∗ max 𝑈2 𝑎
𝑎∈𝐵

must continue until all of the alternatives in the menu have been
evaluated. Only then can the agent identify the maximizer and

It is assumed that the agent has no uncertainty about the

choose it. It may be the case, however, that an agent might begin

value of the outside option, U1(o) = U2(o) = 0. The agent then

analyzing the alternatives of a menu and when they reach a point

compares the potential gain and the cost and decides if it s worth

where the cost of searching the menu becomes too great, rather

it to search the menu, find the maximum, and make the choice.

than defer they may switch their method of decision making and

If the cost of searching the menu is greater than the potential

become a satisficer instead of a maximizer. This would decrease

utility gain, the agent does not spend the effort and instead

the cost of searching the menu, making the decision once again

defers the choice. If the cost of searching the menu is less than

worth making. In fact, psychologists say that each person is not

the potential utility gain, then the agent still stands to gain from

necessarily only a maximizer nor only a satisficer. Every person

making a choice. The agent will then search the menu for the

has a certain inclination towards maximizing in any given

maximum, resulting in the agent becoming certain of their

situation. In one experiment analyzing, among other things, the

utility function. Thus their choice is defined as such for a menu

effect of maximizing on choice overload, subjects had to take a

Bn with n alternatives including the outside option, o, assuming

questionnaire that would rate their maximization inclination on

that the search reveals a true utility function Ui

a 1 to 7 scale. Subjects who scored higher on this scale were
more inclined to maximize when making a choice. The
researchers defined maximizers to be those in the top third of
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the range (above 5.26/7) and satisficers to be those in the

from either of these two processes. Considering each of these

bottom third (below 3.49/7). Their results indicated that

two processes separately and independently, two different

maximizers experience Choice Overload more strongly than do

formulations of the search cost are possible.

satisficers (Schwartz et al, 2002). This result supports the

The first formulation considers the case in which the

assumption of the Search Cost model that agents are strict

cost of decision making comes from discovering the utility to be

maximizers. If the agents were strict satisficers, then the model

gained from each alternative and each utility discovery induces

would not apply since they do not experience Choice Overload,

a cost c. Thus, for a menu with n items,

at least not as strongly. A model could be proposed that includes
a

variable to indicate an agent s inclination toward

𝐾 𝑛

𝑐∗𝑛

maximization, but for simplicity s sake the model presented
here just assumes that agents are maximizers, thus they must
search the whole menu before making a choice.

In this formulation, the agent does not know the utility
to be gained from each choice before the menu is searched. Once

After some thought about the mechanism behind search

the utility of each element is known, the agent is able to

cost, it quickly becomes apparent that there are many nuanced

implement their utility function to immediately and without cost

differences in the ways that the cost of searching for the

discover which element would produce the highest gain in

maximum

can be defined. When an agent evaluates

utility. This formulation assumes for simplicity that the cost to

alternatives in a menu, they must be able to do two things. First,

discover the utility of one element is the same for all elements

they must be able to discover or assign a utility value for each

in the menu. In the resulting value function equation, both the

item. For example, when buying a car, a consumer must take a

expected maximum utility in menu B and the cost of evaluating

look at all the features of a car before they can fully understand

the utilities of the entire menu are increasing in n (See

the utility that car will have for them. Second, they must have

Proposition 1 for proof of why the expected maximum utility in

some way of comparing the utilities of alternatives to figure out

menu B increases with n).

a preference ranking for them. Here, the consumer is looking at

The second formulation considers the case in which the

the difference in features between two cars and deciding which

cost of decision making comes not from discovering the utility

car is better based on the features that they most value. After

to be gained from each alternative, but rather from the act of

completing both of these processes, the consumer is finally able

comparing the utilities of each alternative to form a ranking and

to determine which of the available cars is the best and make

discover the maximum. Each comparison between two elements

their choice.

induces a cost of c. Thus, for a menu with n items,

In Utility Maximization, this is all assumed away such
that it is done costlessly with the agent s utility function. In real
life, however, both of these processes involve some cost, usually

𝐾 𝑛

𝑐∗

𝑛!
2∗ 𝑛 2 !

manifesting in the form of time or mental strain. The cost,
however, can also be monetary if the agent, for example, pays a

In this formulation, the agent is able to know the utility

car expert to compare the cars for them or there is a fee

of each element in a menu without cost, but the agent does not

associated with test driving the cars to discover how smoothly

have a utility function that allows them to compare all elements

each one handles the road. In any case, the search cost can come

simultaneously. The agent is only able to figure out which
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element has the highest utility by searching the entire menu and

The expected maximum utility is more than the cost of

ranking every element. This formulation assumes that the agent

evaluating the menu, 5 > 4, thus the agent does not experience

only uses pair-wise comparison and that, for simplicity, each

choice overload and chooses the alternative that maximizes

comparison induces an equivalent cost. Once the agent has

utility for the true utility function. In this case, whether that is

ranked each element, they will discover the element of greatest

U1 or U2 make no difference since the agent chooses a in both.

utility. One can imagine this cost becoming quite large when

Now say that the agent faces a three-item menu B =

each element has multiple aspects to consider, such as a

{o, a, b} which includes an alternatives a and b and the option

consumer deciding between apartment listings of different types

to defer the choice, o. With the same utility discovery cost, will

and in different neighborhoods. As before, in the resulting value

the agent now experience Choice Overload?

function, both the expected maximum utility in menu B and the
cost of ranking the utilities of the entire menu are increasing in

Solution:

n.

The expected utility from searching is
𝐸 max 𝑈𝑖 𝑎
𝑎∈𝐵

Example 1

0.5 ∗ 6.5

0.5 ∗ 4

5.25,

The cost of evaluating every item in B is
K(n) = c*n = 2 ∗ 3

6

Say an agent operates within a domain including the alternatives

The expected maximum utility is less than the cost of evaluating

{o, a, b}. Suppose the agent is first faced with a two-item menu

the menu, 5.25 < 6, thus the agent does experience choice

B = {o, a} which includes an alternative a and the option to

overload and chooses to defer.

defer the choice, o. The agent believes with probability 0.5 that
they will experience U1 and with probability 0.5 that they will

Model 2: The Regret Aversion Model

experience U2, defined as such
In this model type, the cost of making a choice comes
U1

U2

not from the effort or time required to make the choice, but is

o

0

0

instead from the potential regret the agent may face after making

a

6

4

the choice. In this case, the actual process of evaluating the

b

6.5

3

items in a menu and figuring out which one is the potential
maximum is assumed away to isolate the effect of the cost of

Each element incurs a cost of 2 to discover its utility. Will this

regret. The agent doesn t have to incur any cost at the moment

agent experience Choice Overload?

of the decision. After the choice is made, however, the agent
may induce a cost in the form of regret. Regret occurs because

Solution:

the agent does not actually know their preferences until after

The expected utility from searching is

they have made a choice. For example, in the case where a

𝐸 max 𝑈𝑖 𝑎
𝑎∈𝐵

0.5 ∗ 6

0.5 ∗ 4

5,

consumer is shopping for a computer, one option might have

The cost of evaluating every item in B is

better battery life, but another option has a bigger screen size

K(n) = c*n = 2 ∗ 2

(which the consumer perceives as a positive thing). The

4
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consumer may not yet know which of these two factors they will

by choosing the alternative that would do the best in the worst

end up valuing more. In one scenario, they may end up finding

case scenario. If the second period turns out to be better than the

that they value battery life more and regret choosing the option

worst case scenario, then the agent will experience a better

with the bigger screen, but the reverse is also possible. One can

situation than their perceived future utility. If they had chosen a

see how increasing the amount of options or increasing the

different alternative, however, they would have experienced

amount of option attributes would put the consumer at an even

worse regret.

greater risk for finding out that another option would have been

Defining the model formally, for a menu B with two

better, thus incurring greater regret. Eventually, the potential

possible future utility functions U1, U2 for alternative a, the

regret a decision could produce could become so great that the

agent s choice from the menu is defined as

consumer experiences choice overload and defers the choice
saying, I ll come back to Best Buy another day.

𝐶 𝐵

argmax min 𝑈1 𝑎
𝑎∈𝐵

𝜆 max 𝑈1 𝑎

𝑈1 𝑎

𝑎∈𝐵

, 𝑈2 𝑎

𝜆 max 𝑈2 𝑎
𝑎∈𝐵

𝑈2 𝑎

To begin talking about regret formally, suppose that
there are two periods, t=0 or 0+. At t=0, the agent has a utility
function U0, and at

t=0+,

the agent is either going to have the

utility function U1 or U2. At t=0, the agent faces a menu and
makes a choice, but at

Thus the value function V is

t=0+,

the agent potentially faces some

𝑉 𝐵

max min 𝑈1 𝑎
𝑎∈𝐵

regret about the choice in t=0.
To create a model that incorporates regret as a cost, the
MinMax Regret Model is used as a base. (Hayashi, 2007) This
base equation can then be expanded upon to incorporate regret
as the cost of making a choice and accommodate Choice
Overload behavior (For further description of the MinMax
Regret model and a discussion on why the MinMax Regret
model itself cannot serve as a comprehensive model of Choice
Overload, please see the Appendix). Say that as an agent
evaluates each alternative, they assume the worst possible

𝜆 max 𝑈1 𝑎
𝑎∈𝐵

𝑈1 𝑎

, 𝑈2 𝑎

𝜆 max 𝑈2 𝑎
𝑎∈𝐵

𝑈2 𝑎

This formulation uses the general concept of the
MinMax Regret model in a new way. Just as in the base regret
model, the agent faces two possible utility functions. That is,
each item has two possible utility values depending on which
utility function is realized in the second period. In real life, an
agent may face more than two possible utility functions, but two
are used here for simplicity.
Let the following portion of the model representing the
agent s possible Future Utilities from choosing alternative a be
defined as such

outcome for each alternative. That is, just as is described in the
MinMax Regret model, the agent sets the value of the alternative
as the future utility it would have if it was chosen in the situation

𝐹𝑈 𝑎|𝐵

min 𝑈1 𝑎

𝜆 max 𝑈1 𝑎
𝑎∈𝐵

𝑈1 𝑎

, 𝑈2 𝑎

𝜆 max 𝑈2 𝑎
𝑎∈𝐵

𝑈2 𝑎

in which it would produce the most regret possible. This future
utility is generated from the utility the agent would gain from

In this portion of the model, the agent evaluates the

the alternative itself and the cost of regret from having chosen

possible utility gain from choosing a in both circumstances. In

that utility. Once the perceived future utility of each alternative

either case, the agent would receive the utility gain of having a,

is set, the agent then chooses the highest utility among them and

𝑈 𝑎 , but they would suffer the regret given the realized utility

the alternative that would produce it. In other words, this agent

function, max 𝑈

assumes the worst possible scenario and tries to hedge their bets

utility gain lost if the maximizer of that utility function is not

𝑈 𝑎 . This regret comes from the potential
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chosen (presumably because the agent chose the maximizer for

Given these values, the agent s perceived Future Utility from

the other possible utility function). The parameter 𝜆 is a measure

each alternative is as follows

of how strongly the agent experiences regret. If 𝜆 is low, then
regret does not as strongly affect that agent s decision, while if

𝐹𝑈 𝑜|𝐵

min 1

6

1 ,1

𝜆 is high, then the agent cares greatly about the possible regret

𝐹𝑈 𝑎 |𝐵

min 6

6

6, 1

from their choice. If 𝜆

1

1
1

4
1

3

0, then the agent does not experience

regret and simply maximizes the lowest possible utility gained

With these Future Utility values, the agent s choice is then

from each alternative. The agent then takes the lesser of the two
possible future utilities and considers that value the predicted

argmax 𝐹𝑈 𝑜|𝐵 , 𝐹𝑈 𝑎|𝐵

𝐶 𝑜, 𝑎

Future Utility from that alternative. Once the predicted Future
Utilities are calculated for each alternative, the agent then
chooses the alternative that provides the highest utility. This
alternative becomes their choice, C(B). In this way, the agent
minimizes the potential regret should the worst case scenario
occur.
The following example shows how this model matches
the Choice Overload evidence by violating the standard model
properties described in Proposition 1 and 2.

𝑎

𝑎∈𝐵

Since 𝐹𝑈 𝑎|𝐵

𝐹𝑈 𝑜 |𝐵 , the agent chooses a from

B. In this smaller menu, though alternative a poses some risk of
regret if U2 is realized (-1 (1+1) = -3), the possible regret from
not choosing a and instead choosing o followed by the
realization of U1 (1

(6

1) = -4) is too great for the agent to

bear. Thus the agent chose a. This could be a circumstance
where apartment a has a much better price than apartment o, but
the location of a might be a little worse than the agent s current
apartment. Because the price is so much better, the agent decides

Example 1: Nonmonotonicity and Choice Deferral

to move and take the risk that they might regret downgrading
their location.

Say that an agent with 𝜆

1 operates within a domain

including an outside option representing deferral, o, and two
alternatives a and b. The agent chooses first from an menu B
comprised of just a and o Thus, B = {o, a}. To make this

Say that the agent then chooses from a menu B
comprised of o, a, and a new alternative b (that is, B = {o, a,
b}). Now the agent s perceived Future Utility from each
alternative is as follows

example more concrete, o can represent the apartment the agent
currently lives in and a can represent the apartment they can
move into. In State 1, U1 is realized and in State 2, U2 is realized.
These utility functions and alternatives are defined by the
following values:
U1

U2

o

1

1

a

6

-1

b

-2

7

𝐹𝑈 𝑜|𝐵′

min 1

6

1 ,1

𝐹𝑈 𝑎|𝐵′

min 6

6

6, 1

7

1

9

𝐹𝑈 𝑏|𝐵′

min

2 ,7

7

7

10

2

6

7

1

5

With these Future Utility values, the agent s choice is then
𝐶 𝑜, 𝑎, 𝑏

argmax 𝐹𝑈 𝑜|𝐵 , 𝐹𝑈 𝑎 |𝐵 , 𝐹𝑈 𝑏|𝐵

𝑜

𝑎∈𝐵
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𝐹𝑈 𝑏 |𝐵′ , the agent

opted instead for deferral, o. In this way, the result demonstrates

chooses o from B and thus defers the decision by going with

the choice deferral behavior of Choice Overload and violates

the outside option. Contrasting with the result of the smaller

Proposition 2.

Since 𝐹𝑈 𝑜|𝐵′

𝐹𝑈 𝑎|𝐵′

menu, in this larger menu both the regret from choosing a and
realizing U2 (-1

(7 + 1) = -9) and the regret from choosing b

Beyond accommodating the possibility of Choice
Overload, this model further follows the psychological evidence

(6 + 2) = -10) are so great that the

by allowing circumstances in which adding more options can

relatively small regret from choosing o while realizing either

increase the value of the menu and lead to results other than

state (1

1) = -5) seems to be the more

deferral. As discussed in Section 2, adding more options to a

attractive option, thus pushing the agent to choose o, deferral.

menu does not always result in Choice Overload. In fact, one

To put it in more qualitative terms, when the third option is

study by Liat Hadar and Sanjay Sood (2014) observed how the

added, the possible future utilities for the agent become much

occurrence of Choice Overload in larger menus is moderated by

more extreme. If a and b are two different apartments the agent

what they term subjective knowledge, which is defined as

is considering moving into, the situation in this larger menu

how knowledgeable the agent feels about the alternatives from

presents two risky options that counterbalance one another. This

which they choose. They use the example of wine and soda.

could be a circumstance in which one apartment has a great

With wines, most people do not feel so knowledgeable about all

price and bad location and the other has a terrible price, but

the attributes of wine and their respective values. With soda,

fantastic location. In the Regret Aversion model, the agent does

most people feel very knowledgeable about the difference in

not know if they value price or location more, and they will not

taste and thus their different personal values. Hadar and Sood

find out until they make a decision between the two. With the

showed that for domains in which the agent has a high level of

added uncertainty from the extreme utilities and extreme

subjective knowledge, the agent is more likely to make a choice

potential regrets, the agent decides to not take the risk and

when presented with a smaller menu, supporting the behavior of

instead chooses the safer option of going with what they already

Choice Overload. For domains in which the agent has a low

know. That is, they defer the choice and went with an outside

level of subjective knowledge, however, the agent is more likely

option, a default option. In this case, that outside option is

to make a choice when presented with a larger menu, supporting

staying in the apartment the agent already lives in. This situation

the classical belief that more is better . This observation could

seems to mirror the thought processes of some real life

explain why there are many more options for wines than there

consumers when faced with the need to choose from a large

are sodas.

and realizing U1 (-2
(6

1) = -4 or 1

(7

The Regret Aversion model presented in this paper is

menu.
This example shows how the Regret Aversion model is

able to accommodate instances of both. Specifically, the model

able to accommodate the observed behaviors called Choice

can show instances of monotonicity and instances of

Overload. First, observe that the value of the menu was

nonmonotonicity,

decreased by adding another alternative. Specifically, 𝑉 𝐵

Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives hold and instances of

instances

where

the

conclusion

of

5. This result is in line with Choice

Choice Deferral. Interestingly, this model can also include some

Overload s property of nonmonotonicity, thus violating

measure of subjective knowledge. If a person has a higher

Proposition 1. Second, observe that in the smaller menu, a non-

subjective knowledge about their alternatives, then the different

deferral choice was selected, a, but in the larger menu, the agent

possible values for any one alternative should be closer together.

3 while 𝑉 𝐵′
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12

https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/yurj/vol1/iss1/38

12

Li Blasheck and Noor: An Economic Model of Choice Overload

SOCIAL
SCIENCES | Behavioral Economics
Social Sciences

VOL. 1.1 | Dec. 2020

That is, the agent is more certain about what the value of the

b}). Now the agent s perceived Future Utility from each

alternative will be. Including subjective knowledge, however, is

alternative is as follows

not the focus of this model and is left to future models for further
development.

𝐹𝑈 𝑜|𝐵′

min 1

6

1 ,1

The previous example demonstrated Choice Overload.

𝐹𝑈 𝑎|𝐵′

min 6

6

6 , 1

The following example demonstrates how the model can also

𝐹𝑈 𝑏|𝐵′

min 2

6

2 ,4

4

1
4

4

4
1

4

6
2

allow for the classical belief of more is better .
Since 𝐹𝑈 𝑏|𝐵′
Example 2: An Instance of More is Better
Say that an agent with 𝜆

𝐹𝑈 𝑜 |𝐵′

𝐹𝑈 𝑎 |𝐵′ , the agent chooses b

from B .

1 operates within a domain

This example shows how the Regret Aversion model is

including an outside option representing deferral, o, and two

able to accommodate the behaviors put forth in the standard

alternatives a and b. The agent chooses first from an menu B

economic model. First, observe that the value of the menu was

comprised of just a and o Thus, B = {o, a}. To make this

increased by adding another alternative. Specifically, 𝑉 𝐵

example more concrete, o can represent the apartment the agent

3 while 𝑉 𝐵′

2. This result is in line with the standard

currently lives in and a can represent the apartment they can

model s property of monotonicity, thus following Proposition 1.

move into. In State 1, U1 is realized and in State 2, U2 is realized.

Second, observe that in the smaller menu, a non-deferral choice

These utility functions and alternatives are defined by the

was selected, a, and in the larger menu, the agent simply

following values:

selected another non-deferral alternative with a higher utility. In
this way, the result demonstrates the preference transitivity
U1

U2

behavior of standard Utility Maximization model and follows

o

1

1

Proposition 2. This kind of flexibility allows the Regret

a

6

-1

Aversion model to more closely follow the psychological

b

2

4

evidence than a model which always results in Choice Overload
when more alternatives are added to a menu.

Given these values, the agent s perceived Future Utility from

4. DISCUSSION

each alternative is as follows
𝐹𝑈 𝑜|𝐵

min 1

6

1 ,1

𝐹𝑈 𝑎|𝐵

min 6

6

6, 1

1

1
1

4. 1 Comparing Models

4
1

The above Search Cost models and the Regret Aversion

3

model are just some of the possible formulations that could build
Since 𝐹𝑈 𝑎|𝐵

𝐹𝑈 𝑜 |𝐵 , the agent chooses a from B.

on the standard Utility Maximization model of economics to
explain the mechanism of Choice Overload. Given the (ironic)

Say that the agent then chooses from a menu B
comprised of o, a, and a new alternative b (that is, B = {o, a,

variety of possible formulations, is it possible to determine if
one is more accurate to the observed data than another? Further
research to explore this question might include field tests that
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measure the rate at which consumers turn to a default or deferral.

process, and then after consumption, did they experience any

Other experiments might include surveying consumers before,

choice regret?

during, and after making a choice to see if the perceived cost
occurred during the process of deciding or afterwards.

The researchers found that there was no significant
difference between the experimental groups in terms of

In fact, Iyengar and Lepper did something just like that

confidence in their choice, anticipated satisfaction, how

in that same aforementioned study (2000). In the same study

informed they felt, nor their tendency to choose a default. This

involving chocolate-loving Columbia University students

all goes against the hypothesis that the subjects are thinking

choosing chocolate pieces from a set, Iyengar and Lepper

through the first mechanism of Choice Overload, search cost.

sought to investigate which of the two mechanisms, search cost

The did, however, find that the extensive group did find the

or regret, the subjects were thinking with as they experienced

decision making process more enjoyable, difficult, and

Choice Overload. To do this, they made a few assumptions.

frustrating. These results support the hypothesis that the subjects

First, they assumed that those who suffer a search cost end up

thought through the second mechanism of Choice Overload,

satisficing in the extensive choice scenario. Because they

regret aversion.

satisfice, they should report that they feel they are making a less

Though these results seem to indicate that the right

informed decision and they should be more likely to opt for a

model is the Regret Aversion model, recall that there exist other

default option. Additionally, they should feel less confident

studies that show support for the use of both Choice Overload

about their choice and predict lower satisfaction with their

mechanisms. Some studies in fact show that methods of

choice. That is, after they have chosen a chocolate and before

decision making change with the size of a menu (Mills, Meltzer,

they consume the piece they chose, they should predict that they

& Clark, 1977; Payne, 1982). Others show that regret may lead

might not be satisfied with their choice. Second, they assumed

to preferring smaller menus (Sarver, 2008; Schwartz, 2004).

that those who suffer from the cost of regret might be more

Additionally, it may be the case that the assumptions made by

invested in the choice making process to avoid the potential

Iyengar and Lepper are the incorrect assumptions to make to

regret, thus they should perceive the choice making process as

parse out which mechanism is at play. For example, as has been

more enjoyable yet also difficult and frustrating in the case of

discussed, it may be the case that when subjects suffer a search

the extensive choice scenario.

cost, they more often just defer the cost rather than switch to a

Iyengar and Lepper then set up an experiment to gather

satisficing model. Indeed it may be the case that both

the relevant metrics. In this experiment, the Columbia students

mechanisms operate depending on the situation. Further

would be divided into the limited, extensive, and control groups

research is needed to see which mechanism occurs under what

as described in Section 1. If they are in an experimental group,

circumstances.

they would choose a piece of chocolate from the set. Then,
before they eat the chocolate, they are asked to rate themselves

4.2 Applications

and their choices on a 1 to 7 scale. These ratings included

Two applications are presented here as instances of

metrics such as how often they choose a default option, their

pricing and product offering that can be uniquely explained by

satisfaction with their choice, how informed they felt making

the Choice Overload models presented in this paper.

the choice, how much they enjoyed the choice making process,

The first application involves a seemingly obvious

how difficult or frustrating they found the choice making

implication of both Choice Overload models: if a firm offers too
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many options, decrease the number of options and sales will
increase. In fact, one firm did just that. Proctor & Gamble is a
company that produces a shampoo called Head and Shoulders.
Initially, Proctor & Gamble offered 26 different varieties of this
shampoo, varying by factors such as scent and hair benefits.
Seemingly following the advice of early marketing studies and
psychological studies of Choice Overload, the company decided
to decrease their product line to just 15 types of shampoo. The
standard model would say that customers would then be less
attracted to Head and Shoulders compared to other shampoo

Figure 1. Source: Sterne Agee

brands which offer a larger variety. Even Iyengar and Lepper s
research would indicate that at least in terms of initial
attractiveness, this decrease in variety could indeed harm the
Head and Shoulder s brand perception. In fact, Proctor &
Gamble experienced a 10% increase in sales after this change
(Osnos, 1997). This matches the behavior as predicted by either
model of Choice Overload presented here. Decreasing the
number of alternatives decreased both the search cost and the
possible regret from making a choice, thus turning some of the
consumers who before would defer such a choice now into
purchasing customers.
The second application involves the difference in
pricing between convenience stores or drugstores, such as
Walgreens, and supermarkets, such as Walmart. Because of the
much larger variety of products that can be found at Walmart,
everything obtainable in a Walgreens could also be found at
Walmart. The standard model would then say that this greater
variety offers greater value to the consumer. Thus, the
supermarket should be able to charge a higher price for its
products. In fact, most know very well that Walgreen s prices
are much higher than Walmart prices, even for the same items.
In fact, one study showed that for the same basket of products,
Walgreens (WAG) charged roughly 40% more than did
Walmart (WMT) (Peterson, 2014).

One might argue that the higher prices of stores such as
Walgreens are due to the convenience of access. They d say
customers are willing to pay higher prices to avoid travelling
longer distances to get to the store. In fact, a study conducted on
the drivers of pricing of staple foods in supermarkets versus
small food stores found that prices of smaller stores did not
significantly differ between stores that were isolated, defined
as stores that were greater than one mile away from the nearest
supermarket, and those that were not (Caspi, 1997). This
indicates that the higher prices of smaller stores with less
variety, such as Walgreens, is not driven by a difference in travel
convenience from the home to the store.
The higher prices, however, do seem consistent with
the predicted behavior of the Choice Overload models. These
models predict that the smaller variety of products found at
Walgreens offers customers an easier shopping experience by
lowering the cost of searching for the right choice and the cost
of potential regret from realizing that the customer could have
chosen a better alternative. At a larger store like Walmart,
customers would have to spend more time searching for the right
item, and they would be aware of the wider variety of
alternatives causing them greater potential regret. Thus, the
Choice Overload models predict that the smaller store with its
easier shopping experience would offer the customers greater
value and thus be able to charge higher prices. Intuitively, this
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result seems to match the observed pricing behavior. It is left to

the utility of the chosen element a. The potential regret that the

future research to demonstrate this more formally with demand

agent worries about is the scenario in which the regret from

functions that include Choice Overload.

choosing a is higher, thus they take the maximum of the two
scenario regrets and that becomes the perceived potential regret
of the choice. The agent then makes a choice from the menu by

5. CONCLUSION

minimizing the regret and choosing the item with the smallest
The standard model of economics, namely Utility

perceived regret. The agent minimizes the maximum possible

Maximization, is able to account for many generalized

regret, hence why it is called the MinMax Regret model. For the

behaviors of human decision making, but it cannot account for

reasons explained below, in this model an agent is either always

the phenomenon known as Choice Overload. In this paper, two

worse off or indifferent from having larger menus when, in fact,

different models were introduced to try to add onto the standard

larger menus can sometimes make the agent better off.

model and find a way to include Choice Overload in the set of
economically explained behaviors. They cover the two main

Difference Between Regret Models

mechanisms of Choice Overload put forth by the preceding
psychological research, and further research is needed to

If one were to use the MinMax Regret model for the

discriminate in which situations each model applies and what

two Regret Aversion model examples above, one would

other factors influence an agent s experience of Choice

generate the same choice for Example 1 and a similar result for

Overload. The Search Cost model and the Regret Aversion

Example 2, with the agent indifferent between a and b instead

models are intended to at least be starting points on which

of having a strict preference for b, so it might seem that the two

further economic research on Choice Overload can build. These

models are nearly the same. A third example, however, can

models help to understand how humans make choices, and how

demonstrate at least one key difference between the two models.

sometimes variety can have a dark side.
Example 3: Difference of Regret Models

6. APPENDIX
Say that an agent with 𝜆
The MinMax Regret Model

1 operates within a domain

including an outside option representing deferral, o, and two
alternatives a and b. The agent chooses first from an menu B

In the MinMax Regret Model model, (Hayashi, 2007)
the regret from choosing item a from menu B is defined as

comprised of just a and o Thus, B = {o, a}. To make this
example more concrete, o can represent the apartment the agent
currently lives in and a can represent the apartment they can

𝑅 𝑎|𝐵

max max 𝑢1 𝑏
𝑏∈𝐵

𝑢1 𝑎 ,

max 𝑢2 𝑏
𝑏∈𝐵

𝑢2 𝑎

move into. In State 1, U1 is realized and in State 2, U2 is realized.
These utility functions and alternatives are defined by the

In this model, the agent may end up having preferences

following values:

defined by U1 or U2. In both states, possible regret comes from
the difference between the highest utility element in menu B and
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U1

U2

𝑅 𝑜 |𝐵′

max 3

1, 3

1

2

o

1

1

𝑅 𝑎 |𝐵′

max 3

2, 3

2

1

a

2

2

𝑅 𝑏 |𝐵′

max 3

3, 3

3

0

b

3

3
Minimizing the regret, the agent would again still choose b from

Given these values, the agent s perceived Future Utility from

B.

each alternative is as follows
There is an important difference here between the
𝐹𝑈 𝑜|𝐵

min 1

2

1 ,1

2

1

0

results of the two models of regret. While the MinMax Regret

𝐹𝑈 𝑎|𝐵

min 2

2

2 ,2

2

2

2

model is able to generate the same choices, it does not lead to
the same monotonicity (or nonmonotonicity) results that the

Since FU a|B

FU o|B , the agent chooses a from B.

Regret Aversion model can accommodate. In the example
above, the agent s utility is shown to increase when first

Implementing the MinMax Regret model, the regret from each

choosing from B and then from B using the Regret Aversion

alternative is as follows

Model. In other words, the agent follows standard monotonicity
behavior. Using the MinMax Regret model, the agent

𝑅 𝑜 |𝐵

max 2

1, 2

1

1

experiences no such gain in utility. In fact, the regret

𝑅 𝑎 |𝐵

max 2

2, 2

2

0

experienced by choosing from the two menus is the same, thus
the agent is indifferent between choosing from the larger menu

Minimizing the regret, the agent would still choose a from B.

versus the smaller menu. This is neither monotonicity nor
nonmonotonicity. In this way, the MinMax Regret model cannot

Say that the agent then chooses from a menu B comprised of o,

demonstrate the same change in utility from differently sized

a, and a new alternative b (that is, B = {o, a, b}). Now the

menus, thus the two models are distinguished.

agent s perceived Future Utility from each alternative is as
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